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THE GATE IS OPEN BUT THE DOOR IS LOCKEDHABEAS CORPUS AND HARMLESS ERROR
BENNETT

L.

GERSHMAN*

State prisoners challenging their confinement through the writ of habeas
corpus must first pass through the gate of the federal court system.' The
Supreme Court's "new habeas" jurisprudence2 has imposed a variety of
4
3
procedural obstacles to block that gate. Defaulted claims, successive claims,
new claims,' and Fourth Amendment claims 6 are generally barred. 7 Even a
claim of actual innocence ordinarily does not gain entry, 8 although it may
serve as a precondition to consideration of otherwise barred claims. 9
* Charles A. Frueauff Research Professor, Pace University School of Law.

1. I use the metaphors of the "gate" and the "door" to distinguish between threshold
questions on federal habeas review and the merits of the claim. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct.
2482, 2500 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Court should decide threshold questions
in favor of petitioner before addressing merits of claim). The Court similarly has employed these
metaphors to describe this distinction. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993) (stating
that "claim of 'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway
through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim
considered on the merits"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 520 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that past decisions were "reasoned decisions that those policies were an insufficient
justification for shutting the federal habeas door to litigants with federal constitutional claims").
2. Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HAslos L.J. 941 (1991). The author describes
how the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have "developed a series of purportedly discretionary
limits on the federal courts' exercise of their habeas jurisdiction which have de facto altered that
jurisdiction beyond recognition." Id. at 1062. Professor Patchel concludes that "by altering the
process by which constitutional adjudication takes place-by moving from a system of dialectical
federalism to one of deference to state court constitutional determinations-those Courts necessarily have altered the future shape of the substantive content of constitutional doctrine as well."
Id. at 1062-63..
3. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
4. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986)
(plurality opinion).
5. Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
6. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
7. The bar may be lifted when the petitioner can demonstrate "cause" and "prejudice"
for the procedural default. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
8. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). The Court left the door slightly ajar for
such a claim:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a capital case
a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made after trial would render
the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if
there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.
Id. at 869.
9. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518-19 (1992) (petitioner otherwise subject to
defenses of abusive or successive use of writ and who cannot meet cause and prejudice standard
nevertheless may have his federal constitutional claim considered on merits if he makes proper
showing of "actual innocence," so that failure to hear his claims would constitute "miscarriage
of justice").
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When an unbarred claim is brought, a petitioner may enter the gate
unimpeded, at least to allow a court to consider his constitutional claim on
the merits. And if the claim has merit, a court has discretion to grant the
writ. 10 However, even with unbarred claims a petitioner ordinarily confronts
another obstacle to prevailing on the merits. Just as reviewing courts may
overlook constitutional errors that are harmless," the federal courts on
collateral review traditionally have applied harmless error principles to preserve
state convictions despite constitutional error.' 2 Prior to Brecht v. Abrahamson,' 3 the federal courts typically applied the same harmless error standard
for collateral review of constitutional errors as they applied on direct appeal,
namely, whether the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.' 4 The issue in Brecht was whether courts should apply the constitutional
harmless error standard for direct appeal on collateral review, or whether
courts should apply a more rigorous standard. A majority of the Court, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that courts should use a more
onerous test, one that requires the petitioner to show not that the error
resulted in the possibility of harm but, rather, that the error caused actual
and substantial harm. Under Brecht, the habeas petitioner could enter the
gate, but he might find the courtroom doors locked and his otherwise
meritorious petition denied.
Brecht is a paradigm of the Rehnquist Court's result-oriented approach
to habeas corpus and harmless error. The decision purports to be a principled
application of the policies of finality, federalism, and judicial economy that
underlay the Court's new habeas and harmless error jurisprudence. It is, in
fact, an unwarranted and unprincipled extension of those policies. Depending
on how the lower federal courts interpret and implement the decision, Brecht
could have a devastating impact on the way state prosecutors and judges
administer criminal justice, as well as the ability of state prisoners to redress
constitutional violations.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Lower Court Findings
Todd Brecht, an ex-convict, resided with his sister and her husband,
Roger Hartman, in their Wisconsin home. 5 There was some tension in the
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988) (judge required to "dispose of the matter as law and justice
require"); Stone, 428 U.S. at 478 n.11 (reaffirming equitable nature of writ and emphasizing
that "discretion is implicit in the statutory command"); Patchel, supra note 2, at 964 ("This
focus on discretionary limits on habeas jurisdiction subsequently became a hallmark of the
Court's decisions limiting the scope of habeas review.").
11. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
12. See infra note 14 (discussing Chapman standard).
13. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
14. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ("beneficiary of a constitutional error [required] to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained").
15. State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 98-99 (Wis. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), and aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
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household because Hartman, a local district attorney, did not approve of
Brecht's drinking habits and homosexual orientation. When the Hartmans
were away, Brecht broke into a liquor cabinet and began drinking. He found
a rifle and began shooting cans in the backyard. When Hartman returned
home from work, Brecht shot him in the back and sped off in Mrs. Hartman's
car. Brecht drove the car into a ditch, and when a police officer stopped to
offer help, Brecht told him that his sister knew about the mishap and had
summoned a tow-truck. Brecht then hitched a ride to Winona, Minnesota,
where he was stopped by police, identified, and arrested for the shooting.
He told the police that it was a "big mistake." He was returned to Wisconsin,
arraigned, and given his Miranda rights. Roger Hartman died, and Brecht
was charged with first-degree murder.
At his trial, Brecht admitted shooting Hartman but claimed it was an
accident. He testified that when he saw Hartman pulling into the driveway,
he ran to replace the gun but tripped on the stairs, causing the gun to fire
the fatal shot. Seeing what he had done, Brecht panicked and drove away.
The prosecution offered circumstantial evidence to prove that the shooting
was intentional: forensic proof of the bullet's somewhat horizontal trajectory,
the location outside the house where the rifle was found, and proof of
Hartman's hostility toward Brecht as the motive for the shooting. In addition,
the prosecutor pointed out that Brecht had failed to tell anyone that the
shooting was an accident-the officer who first encountered him beside the
ditch, or the Winona police who arrested him.' 6 During his cross examination
of Brecht, and over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor asked Brecht
whether he had ever told anyone prior to trial that the shooting was an
accident, to which Brecht replied "No.' '1 7 During his closing argument, the
prosecutor also made several references about Brecht's pretrial silence to the

16. The prosecutor made extensive use of Brecht's silence both before and after he was
given Miranda warnings. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the prosecutor's references
to Brecht's pre-Miranda silence were permissible and did not violate Brecht's constitutional rights.
Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at 103; see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-40 (1980) (holding Fifth
Amendment not violated when testifying defendant impeached with his pre-arrest silence). The
federal district court on habeas review agreed with this conclusion. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759
F. Supp. 500, 507 (W.D. Wis. 1991), rev'd, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), and aff'd, 113 S.
Ct. 1710 (1993).
17. The prosecutor's cross-examination of Brecht included the following:
Q. In fact the first time you have ever told this story is when you testified here today
was it not?
A. You mean the story of actually what happened?

Q. Yes.
A. I knew what happened, I'm just telling it the way it happened, yes, I didn't have
a chance to talk to anyone, I didn't want to call somebody from a phone and give
up my rights, so I didn't want to talk about it, no sir.
The prosecutor on re-cross examination inquired:
Q. Did you tell anyone about what had happened in Alma?
A. No I did not.
Brecht, 421 N.W.2d at 103.
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jury, insinuating that Brecht tailored his newly-fabricated claim to mesh with
the state's proof. 8 The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Brecht was sentenced
to life imprisonment.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. 19 The court
found that the prosecutor's references to Brecht's post-Miranda silence violated due process under Doyle v. Ohio, 20 and that the error was sufficiently
prejudicial to require reversal. 21 The court emphasized the "frequency" and
"vigorous nature" with which the prosecutor assailed Brecht's silence, the
closeness of the proof on the issue of intent, and the "critical" role of
Brecht's credibility in the outcome?
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reinstated the conviction.2? The court
agreed that the prosecutor had committed constitutional error but concluded
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that
the improper references were relatively brief, comprising less than two pages
of a nine hundred page transcript, and that the evidence of guilt was
"strong." 24
Brecht petitioned the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus,
reasserting the Doyle violation. The district court set aside the conviction. 2
The court concluded that the error violated due process, and that under the
standard for constitutional error formulated in Chapman v. California,6 the

18. During closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to "remember that Mr. Brecht
never volunteered until in this courtroom what happened in the Hartman residence.. .;" "He
sits back here and sees all of our evidence go in and then comes out with this crazy story.. ."
"I know what I'd say [had I been in the defendant's shoes], I'd say 'hold on, this was a mistake,
this was an accident, let me tell you what happened,' but he didn't say that did he. No, he
waited until he hears our story." Id.
19. State v. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 421 N.W.2d 96 (Wis.
1988) and rev'd sub nom. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), and aff'd, 113
S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
20. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Doyle recognized that a suspect's silence after being given Miranda
warnings may be nothing more than an exercise of rights guaranteed by those warnings and
therefore "insolubly ambiguous." Id. at 617. The Court found it fundamentally unfair for the
state to implicitly assure a suspect that prosecutors would not use his silence against him, and
then turn around and use that silence for impeachment. Id. at 618. "Mhe use for impeachment
purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings,
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 619.
21. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d at 723. "In a first-degree murder prosecution in which intent is
established solely by circumstantial evidence and the defendant's credibility is a critical issue,
impermissible comments that attack credibility heighten the danger of prejudice .... Because the
defense relied heavily upon Brecht's credibility and because the prosecutor's comments were
clearly improper, we conclude that the comments on Brecht's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence
were prejudicial.
22. Id. at 722-23.
23. State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 106 (Wis. 1988) rev'd sub nom. Brecht v. Abrahamson,
944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), and aff'd, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993).
24. Id. at 104.
25. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759 F. Supp. 500, 510 (W.D. Wis. 1991), rev'd, 944 F.2d 1363
(7th Cir. 1991), and aff'd, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993).
26. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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state failed to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Reviewing de novo the state court's determination that the error was
harmless,27 the district court found that the evidence of guilt was not "overwhelming," and that the prosecutor's references were "crucial" because
Brecht's defense turned on his credibility?8 According to the district court,
"the state's remarks that [Brecht] simply concocted a 'crazy story' at the
'29
time of trial may have been determinative.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed? 0 The Seventh
Circuit agreed that the prosecutor violated Doyle,31 but differed with the
district court on the nature of the violation and on the applicable harmless
error standard. 32 The circuit court construed Doyle not as a constitutional
right, but as a "prophylactic rule ... to protect another prophylactic rule
[Miranda] from erosion or misuse." 33 Having determined that a Doyle violation is not a constitutional error, the circuit court applied the harmless
error standard for nonconstitutional errors found in Kotteakos v. United
States4-whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury's verdict." 35 Applying this standard, the circuit court
concluded that given the otherwise proper references to Brecht's pretrial
silence, the petitioner could not contend with a "straight face" that the
prosecutor's references had a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's
6
verdict.1
B.

Brecht v. Abrahamson and the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question which the
Court failed to reach five years earlier in Greer v. Miller3 7-whether the
traditional standard for constitutional harmless error applies on collateral
review of Doyle violations. 8 The majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, initially disagreed
with the Seventh Circuit's characterization of the Doyle rule as a nonconstitutional rule.39 Doyle, the majority explained, "was not simply a further
extension of the Miranda prophylactic rule. Rather, as we have discussed, it

27. United States v. Flannigan, 884 F.2d 945, 950-51 (7th Cir. 1989) (federal court not
bound by state court's ruling that constitutional error is harmless), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1027
(1990).
28. Brecht, 759 F. Supp. at 508.
29. Id.
30. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1376 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct.
2931 (1992), and aff'd by 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
31. Id. at 1368.
32. Id. at 1375.
33. Id. at 1370.
34. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
35. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
36. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1376.
37. 483 U.S. 756 (1987).
38. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 761 n.3, 765 (1987).
39. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993).
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is rooted in fundamental fairness and due process concerns. '40 Having
determined that a Doyle violation is a constitutional error, the Court further
decided that a Doyle violation "fits squarely into the category of constitutional
violations which we have characterized as 'trial error,"' and is therefore
"amenable to harmless error analysis" under the standard formulated in
41
Chapman v. California.
The Court observed, however, that the Chapman
standard applies to direct review, and "we have yet squarely to address its
applicability on collateral review." 42 The habeas corpus statute, the Court
noted, is silent on the standard of review of constitutional error.43 The Court
proceeded to "fill the gap[]" by examining "the considerations underlying
our habeas jurisprudence," and "whether the proposed rule would advance
or inhibit these considerations by weighing the marginal costs and benefits
of its application on collateral review."' 44
The Court commenced this portion of its discussion by reiterating that
"collateral review is different from direct review. ' 45 Because of this difference,
the Court observed, different rules have been prescribed for habeas than have
been applied on direct review. 46 These standards are considerably more
restrictive than similar standards pertaining to direct review, the Court noted,
and they serve to confine habeas corpus to a "secondary and limited" role
that is reserved only to those 'persons whom society has grievously
wronged."' 47 The Court explained that considerations of finality, federalism,
and comity have traditionally supported such disparate treatment. 48 "State
courts are fully qualified to identify constitutional error and evaluate its
prejudicial effect," and often are in a superior position to make such
determinations.4 9 Thus, "it scarcely seems logical to require federal habeas
courts to engage in the identical approach to harmless error review that
Chapman requires state courts to engage in on direct review." 0
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1718. The Court cited the following several cases in which -it had applied the
Chapman standard on habeas review: Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478
U.S. 570 (1986); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523
(1968) (per curiam).
43. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718. The federal habeas corpus statute directs the court to
"dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988). The proposed
Habeas Corpus Reform Act does not specify any particular standard of review, but does state:
"[T]he Federal courts, in reviewing an application under this section, shall review de novo the
rulings of a State court on matters of federal law, including the application of federal law to
facts." S.1441, 103d Cong., IstSess. § 2257(b) (1993).
44. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993).
45. Id.

46. Id.at 1720. Examples of such disparate treatment, the Court noted, include rules
governing retroactivity, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the right to counsel, Pennsylvania
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), the "plain error" rule, United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152
(1982), and Fourth Amendment claims, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
47. Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1719 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440-441 (1963)).
48. Id. at 1720.
49. Id. at 1721.
50. Id.
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The Court discounted the suggestion that easing the Chapman standard
on collateral review would undermine the interest of deterring states from
relaxing their enforcement of constitutional rights.5' In any event, the Court
stated, "the costs of applying the Chapman standard on federal habeas
outweigh the additional deterrent effect, if any, which would be derived from
its application on collateral review. '" 52 Moreover, retrying defendants whose
convictions are set aside imposes significant "social costs," which militate in
53
favor of applying a more rigorous standard on habeas review.
Thus, although disagreeing with the theoretical basis upon which the
Seventh Circuit's decision rested, the Court nevertheless agreed with, and
substantially broadened, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the Chapman
standard should not be applied on collateral review of Doyle violations. The
Court agreed that the Kotteakos standard for nonconstitutional error is "better
tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review, and more likely to
promote the considerations underlying our recent habeas cases." 5 4 Under this
test, habeas petitioners can obtain relief for any constitutional trial error if
"they can establish" that the error "had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict. '55 Petitioners have the burden of
establishing, in other words, "that [the constitutional trial error] resulted in
'actual prejudice.' ' 5 6 The Court, in a footnote, left the door slightly ajar for
"an unusual case, a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type,
or one that is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct," even
5 7
though the misconduct did not substantially influence the jury's verdict.
5
Justice Stevens provided the crucial fifth vote for the Court's decision. 1
He wrote a concurring opinion cautioning lower federal courts against an
unduly broad interpretation, and emphasizing that the Court's new standard
"is appropriately demanding." 9 Disagreeing with the assertion in the majority
opinion that the burden of proof rests on the petitioner, Justice Stevens

51. Id. at 1721. "Absent affirmative evidence that state-court judges are ignoring their
oath, we discount petitioner's argument that courts will respond to our ruling by violating their
Article VI duty to uphold the Constitution." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. Such costs include "expenditure of additional time and resources," '"erosion of
memory' and 'dispersion of witnesses,"' and "the frustration of society's interest in the prompt
administration of justice." Id.
54. Id. at 1722.
55. Id. (emphasis added). The Court cited United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986),
as authority for this holding. Lane did apply the "actual prejudice" standard to a nonconstitutional error. Lane, however, did not place the burden of proving harm upon the defendant,
and the Court's citation for that novel rule is misplaced. The Habeas Corpus Reform Act would
place the burden of proving harmlessness upon the State. See supra note 43 (discussing Habeas
Corpus Reform Act); infra note 83 (same).
56. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993).
57. Id. at 1722 n.9.
58. Justice Stevens had concurred in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987), but would have
reached the question left open by the Court, and held that a federal court on habeas review
should apply a more relaxed harmless error standard in reviewing Doyle violations. Id. at 768.
59. Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1723.
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explicitly stated that the burden of showing the error's harmlessness rests on

the government.60 Moreover, the reviewing court must evaluate the error
under the Court's "longstanding commitment to the de novo standard of
review of mixed questions of law and fact in habeas corpus proceedings." 6'

Justice Stevens also emphasized the portion of Justice Rutledge's opinion in
Kotteakos concerning the methodology for judicial review of harmless error.
He admonished federal judges not to speculate upon probable reconviction,2
or upon whether the reviewing court believed the defendant to be guilty.

Quoting a familiar passage in Kotteakos, Justice Stevens emphasized
that the question is not were they [the jurors] right in their judgment,
regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what
effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon
the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the impact of the thing done
wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total
setting.
60. Justice Stevens asserted that the majority opinion "is correct" because that opinion,
among other things, "places the burden on prosecutors to explain why those errors were
harmless." Id. One wonders, therefore, why Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion when
there existed such a substantial difference concerning the party bearing the burden of proof on
the issue of harm, as well as the rigorousness with which lower courts should evaluate the impact
of the error. Given Justice Stevens' concurring opinion explicitly dissociating himself from the
majority's placement of the burden on the defendant, it would appear that a majority of the
Court (Justice Stevens and the four dissenters) endorses the traditional rule imposing the burden
on the prosecutor to prove harmlessness, as well as an approach to harmless error analysis
considerably more demanding than the approach taken by the plurality. Several circuit courts
that have employed the new Brecht standard have placed the burden on the petitioner to prove
substantial harm. See Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating petitioner
must show that alleged error had substantial and injurious effect on jury's verdict), cert. denied
62 U.S.L.W. 3615, 62 U.S.L.W. 3623 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1994) (No. 93-971); Tague v. Richards, 3
F.3d 1133, 1140 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that petitioner not entitled to habeas relief unless
petitioner can establish that error resulted in actual prejudice); Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423,
1427 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating burden is on petitioner to show error had significant inculpatory
impact); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715, 724 (11th Cir.) (stating that relevant habeas corpus
inquiry was whether petitioner could prove actual prejudice), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 650 (1993).
By contrast, some circuit courts have placed the burden on the government to prove lack of
substantial harm. See Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that prosecutor
bears burden of proof to demonstrate that error did not have substantial and injurious effect on
jury's verdict); Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that burden of
sustaining verdict rested on prosecutor to demonstrate error was harmless). Some circuit courts
that have applied the standard have not indicated which party bears the burden of proof. See
Shaw v. Collins, 5 F.3d 128 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Lowery in applying Brecht standard to
videotaped testimony of victim); Duest v. Singletary, 997 F.2d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing
Cumbie in applying Brecht standard), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1126 (1994); McKinney v. Rees,
993 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir.) (applying Brecht standard), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 622 (1993);
Pemberton v. Collins, 991 F.2d 1218, 1226 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622 (1993).
61. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1724 (1993). The standard "requires a habeas
court to review the entire record de novo in determining whether the error influenced the jury's
deliberations." Id. at 1723.
62. Id. at 1724. The standard requires courts to engage in the "discrimination ...of
judgment transcending confinement by formula or precise rule." Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946)).
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This must take account of what the error meant to them, not
singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that
happened. And one must judge others' reactions not by his own, but
with allowance for how others might react and not be regarded
generally as acting without reason. This is the important difference,
but one easy
to ignore when the sense of guilt comes strongly from
63
the record.
"In the end," Justice Stevens wrote, "the way we phrase the governing
standard is far less important than the quality of the judgment with which
it is applied." 6'
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and
Souter joined. Justice White found it "inexplicable" that to obtain relief
based upon a constitutional error that is harmful under the Chapman standard, a petitioner must bear the burden of proving actual prejudice. 65 More6 subjects virtually all constitutional trial
over, because Arizona v. Fulminant&
errors to harmless error analysis, "a state court determination that a constitutional error ... is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt has in effect become
unreviewable by lower federal courts by way of habeas corpus." 67 Further,
to the extent that the availability of habeas relief deters prosecutors and
judges from violating their constitutional responsibilities, the Court's decision
undermines this purpose. 6 Justice White summarized the issue in this way:
Ultimately, the central question is whether States may detain someone whose conviction was tarnished by a constitutional violation that
is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman dictates that
they may not; the majority suggests that, so long as direct review
69
has not corrected this error in time, they may.
Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissenting opinion. Justice O'Connor's
dissent assailed the majority for ignoring what she contended was the central
goal of the criminal justice system-to provide accurate determinations of
guilt and innocence. 70 Habeas corpus is an equitable remedy, Justice O'Connor
wrote, and the ultimate equity on the habeas petitioner's side is the "possibility
that an error may have caused the conviction of an actually innocent
person." 7' The Chapman harmless error standard is "inextricably intertwined"
with the goal of reliable determinations of guilt. 72 A verdict that is found to
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt "sufficiently restores confidence in

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1725.
Id. at 1727.
499 U.S. 279 (1991).
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1727 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 1728.
Id. at 1729.
Id.
Id. at 1730.
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the verdict's reliability that the conviction may stand despite the potentially
accuracy impairing error. '73 By contrast, Justice O'Connor argued, the Kotteakos standard does not offer an adequate assurance of the verdict's reliability. 74 "By tolerating a greater probability that an error with the potential
to undermine verdict accuracy was harmful, the Court increases the likelihood
that a conviction will be preserved despite an error that actually affected the
reliability of the trial." 75 Justice O'Connor offered the cynical observation
that the only explanation for the Court's adoption of a more onerous harmless
error standard for collateral review is "that denying [habeas] relief whenever
'76
possible is an unalloyed good."
II.

THE CONTINUING DECLINE OF HABEAS CORPUS

Brecht v. Abrahamson fuses two major goals of the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts: restricting habeas corpus and expanding harmless error. Although
the Courts substantially achieved both goals prior to Brecht, that case merged
these objectives under the rhetoric of finality, federalism, and judicial economy. This familiar rhetoric has been the hallmark of the new habeas jurisprudence, in much the same way that it has formed the linchpin for the
Court's broadened application of harmless error. The Court's aggressive
result-oriented approach to both habeas corpus and harmless error has
countered and displaced much of the Warren Court's expansive constitutionalization of criminal procedure.
One cannot neatly summarize the "new habeas." Each Term seems to
bring several new decisions that further restrict the availability of the writ.

Clearly, the habeas of Brown v. Allenv and Fay v. Noia7 is a far cry from
the habeas of Teague v. Lane,79 McCleskey v. Zant,w° Coleman v. Thompson,"'
and Brecht v. Abrahamson.2 In the absence of legislation amending the

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1732.
77. 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) ("The State court cannot have the last say when it, though
on fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a
federal constitutional right.").
78. 372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963) (finding that federal habeas corpus statute manifests "clear
congressional policy of affording a federal forum for the determination of the federal claims of
state criminal defendants"), overruled by Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
79. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (habeas unavailable if constitutional violation "new rule" announced subsequent to petitioner's conviction).
80. 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (habeas unavailable if constitutional violation not raised in previous
habeas petition).
81. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (habeas unavailable if constitutional violation not preserved in
state appellate proceedings).
82. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993) (habeas unavailable if constitutional violation did not actually
prejudice petitioner's rights).
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federal habeas corpus statute,"' the Court has shown an extraordinarily activist
bent to federal criminal procedure by recasting the habeas statute in a manner
markedly different from the interpretation of the Court a generation ago.
Virtually all of the Court's recent decisions have imposed procedural
barriers to invoking the writ. These restrictions are grounded on principles
of federal abstention to the exercise of state power. In one instance, however,
the Court has actually imposed a substantive limitation by removing from
habeas coverage a specific constitutional claim. In Stone v. Powell, 4 the
Court held that when the state provides a full and fair opportunity to litigate
a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that the
prisoner be granted habeas relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search and seizure was used at his trial. Although Stone
represents a significant reduction in constitutional protection, the Court has
resisted further opportunities to remove other substantive constitutional claims
from habeas review.8" However, in no case prior to Brecht has the Court
imposed a different substantive standard for reviewing the same constitutional
violation, depending on whether the claim was reviewed on direct appeal or
collateral review.8 6 By formulating a more rigorous harmless error standard
for habeas review, and inexplicably shifting the burden of proof from the
government to the petitioner, the Brecht Court has imposed as formidable a
substantive barrier to prevailing on meritorious constitutional claims as any
that the Court has ever erected.
Prior to Brecht, a federal court was precluded from granting habeas relief
with respect to constitutional trial errors unless three conditions were met:
first, that a non-Fourth Amendment constitutional violation was committed;
second, that the petitioner was not procedurally barred from having his claim
heard on the merits; and third, that the state reviewing court concluded,

83. The Habeas Corpus Reform Act (known as the "Biden Bill") presently being considered
by Congress would amend the habeas corpus act in some respects, although largely incorporating
several of the Supreme Court's most restrictive rulings. With regard to Brecht, the bill requires
the state to bear the burden of proving harmlessness, and also requires de novo review by federal
courts of state court rulings on matters of federal law. See S. 1441, 103d Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 2257(b) (1993); see also Daniel Wise, House, Senate Diverge On Altering HabeasLaw, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 9, 1993, at 1.
84. 428 U.S. 465, 489-496 (1976).
85. See Vithrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993) (Miranda claims); Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel);
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (equal protection claims involving grand jury discrimination);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (due process claims of insufficient evidence).
86. Harmless error is more appropriately classified as a substantive rule than a procedural
rule. See ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THF RIDDLE OF HAimLass ERROR 39-40 (1970) ("[A] harmlesserror rule could hardly be deemed procedural. It has nothing to do with regulating the methods
by which the facts are made known to the court. It does not come into play until all the facts
are known, the area of dispute is defined, and the materials have been presented for the
determination of rights and duties. Far from being procedural, a harmless-error rule is of a piece
with substantive rules, for it too is a mandate to the judge, at this stage the appellate judge,
calling for the last word on the legal effect of the findings."); see also Edmund M. Morgan,
Rules of Evidence: Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. Ray. 467, 468 (1957).
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erroneously, either that no constitutional violation occurred, or notwithstand-

ing the violation, that no reasonable possibility existed that the violation
contributed to the result.Y Only if all three of these conditions were met
would a federal court have the discretionary authority to vacate the conviction.88 Moreover, when these conditions are met, as in Brecht-when the state
has committed a constitutional violation and then arguably failed to correct
it-then a federal judicial policy of nonintervention, or diminished opportunity

for intervention, requires "some reasoned institutional justification" for restricting redetermination on the merits.89 By limiting federal redetermination
in instances of acknowledged constitutional violations, and under circumstances in which review is not procedurally barred, the majority in Brecht
authorized a radical departure from settled practice without any principled

justification for such a result.
The Court's failure to provide a reasoned analysis is graphically illustrated

by its cursory reference to the policy of finality as one of the principal
grounds for its decision. To be sure, the rhetoric of finality has been the
driving force behind the Court's restriction of habeas review.90 The rationale
usually attributed to finality in habeas litigation is to accord conclusiveness

to a presumptively correct state judgment that has survived direct review
within the state court system. The Court in Brecht simply asserted, without
any further elaboration, that a state court should be permitted to rely on the
policy of finality to protect its judgment from collateral attack. The Court

cited three habeas decisions for that assertion.9' Unlike Brecht, none of those
cases involved a petition for collateral review to remedy a conceded constitutional violation that the state review process arguably failed to correct
under the federal harmless error standard. There is no presumption of

correctness to such a judgment, nor any institutional justification for according
conclusiveness to that judgment. To be sure, the interest in finality is
implicated whenever a judgment is challenged collaterally. However, if finality

87. Brecht does not address whether its new standard applies if the state court never
considered the harmless error issue because it found no constitutional error. The Court's emphasis
in Brecht on the illogic of requiring a federal court to engage in the identical harmless error
analysis review that Chapman requires state courts to engage suggests that the new approach to
harmless error review under Brecht would not be applicable when the state court did not review
the constitutional error under the Chapman standard. For a recent circuit court decision adopting
this approach, see Omdorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1993).
88. The Court has consistently asserted that habeas is an equitable remedy and that a court
always has the discretion to grant or deny the writ. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963)
(describing discretionary nature of granting habeas corpus writ).
89. Paul M. Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,
76 HARv. L. Ray. 441, 451 (1963).
90. Patchel, supra note 2, at 943. Professor Bator's functional analysis of habeas review
has been one of the most influential philosophical justifications for the Court's new restrictive
approach to habeas review. See generally Bator, supra note 89 (discussing and analyzing Court's
functional analysis).
91. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993) (citing Wright v. West, 112 S.
Ct. 2482 (1992)); McCleskey v. Zant, II1 S.Ct. 1454, 1468-69 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
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could be invoked to justify restricting the availability of habeas relief when
a state judgment concededly is marred by constitutional error, as in Brecht,

then federal courts could use finality to justify restricting habeas conceivably
in every context. Congress could hardly have intended such a construction
when it enacted the Habeas Corpus Act.
The Court's reliance on the policies of federalism and comity suffers
from the same instrumentalism. The Court merely reiterated the familiar
rhetoric of federalism and comity: "States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law"; 92 states "hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights"; 93 and federal interference with
such state duties "frustrate[s] both the States' sovereign power to punish
offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." 94
However, invoking the rhetoric of judicial deference in the context of a
conceded deprivation of a fair trial is patently disingenuous. Indeed, one
might reasonably view such a context as the paradigmatic occasion for
collateral review under habeas corpus, rather than a cause for indiscriminate
deference to state constitutional derelictions.
Moreover, the Court argues that federal review of constitutional errors
under Chapman is unnecessary because no evidence shows that states are
failing to protect federal constitutional rights. This argument goes too far.
In essence, taken to its logical conclusion, the Court seems to suggest that
habeas review is unnecessary because states are satisfactorily protecting constitutional rights. In addition, this argument also misconceives the role of
habeas as a deterrent to unconstitutional state action. The writ, although
substantially weakened, is nonetheless the only recourse, save for certiorari
to the Supreme Court, for federal redress of state constitutional violations
that have gone uncorrected in state proceedings. Brecht ignores this point:
the prosecutor in Brecht engaged in deliberate and fundamentally unfair
conduct that violated the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. Every
reviewing court agreed on this point; their disagreement was over the extent
of the prejudice. One can hardly doubt that foreclosing a federal court from
applying longstanding federal harmless error doctrine to measure the extent
of that prejudice and substituting instead a virtually unreachable standard
would serve the interests of federalism and comity. However, such action
would also fail to protect federal constitutional rights from encroachments
by state prosecutors and judges.
Indeed, Brecht's impact will not likely be lost on state officials. Prosecutors now know that a conviction marred by constitutional trial error that
survives state review will be further insulated from collateral attack. State
appellate courts now know that an affirmance of a conviction despite constitutional error is more secure under Brecht than ever before.

92. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. at 1720 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128
(1982)).

93. Id.
94. Id.
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The Court's reliance on federalism and comity arguably is relevant in
other contexts. For example, when state prisoners have defaulted on state
claims, have otherwise abused process, or have invoked new constitutional
principles that were not apparent when their conviction was obtained, state
courts may be acting reasonably and in good faith in reviewing, or declining
to review, constitutional claims. Indeed, unless a petitioner can advance a
sufficient claim of actual innocence, a petitioner would be hard put to
demonstrate that the equities favor federal intervention. However, one cannot
make a similar argument for federal restraint when: (1) the state itself has
defaulted in upholding constitutional rights; (2) the petitioner has made a
good-faith attempt to litigate her constitutional claims in the state courts;
and (3) the state's judgment is being assailed for failing to vindicate the
violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights. The equities in such circumstances plainly favor the petitioner, not the state, and federal abstention, or
diminished opportunity for correction, in Justice White's view, is "inexplicable." 95
Thus, the majority has no support when it asserts that "it scarcely seems
logical to require federal courts to engage in the identical approach to
harmless-error review that Chapman requires state courts to engage in on
direct review." 96 It is no more illogical to require de novo review of the
state's harmless error determination than to require de novo review by federal97
courts as to whether a state constitutional error was committed at all.
Indeed, it is both illogical and unfair to deny de novo federal review of
constitutional errors under the federal standard when the state court arguably
has not accorded a petitioner a full and fair review. To be sure, federal
courts accord state courts considerable deference, particularly with respect to
state fact-finding determinations. 9 However, federal courts never accord
deference for erroneous applications of federal law. An erroneous application
of Chapman's federal standard has never been entitled to a deferential
standard of review.
Moreover, it is beside the point for the Court to assert that state courts
''occupy a superior vantage point from which to evaluate the effect of trial
error" and "are fully qualified to identify constitutional error and evaluate
its prejudicial effect on the trial process." 99 The undeniable fact is that the
prosecutor in Brecht committed a constitutional transgression, and the state
appellate court arguably failed in its constitutional obligation to evaluate that
violation correctly. When the state defaults in protecting constitutional rights,
either in committing the violation or failing to correct it, it is neither principled
nor logical to suggest that federalism and comity prevent a federal court from
95. Id. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1721.
97. Id. at 1710 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988) (stating that state court findings of fact are entitled to
presumption of correctness and are reversible only when found to be clearly erroneous); Sumner
v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-547 (1981) (discussing § 2254(d)).
99. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (1993).
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redressing that violation under the self-same federal standard that the state
court misapplied initially.
For similar reasons, the majority's reliance on "social costs" for replacing
the Chapman standard on habeas review is illogical and perverse. To the
Court, these costs outweigh the benefits of correcting constitutional errors,
including the benefits of deterring state prosecutors and judges from violating
constitutional rights and of providing judicial relief to a person whom society
has wronged. Once again, if carried further, this justification would abolish
collateral review. Every form of collateral review necessitates expenditure of
time and resources, frequently involves erosion of memory and dispersion of
witnesses, and may frustrate society's interest in the prompt administration
of justice. The Court has consistently invoked these "costs" as one of the
principal justifications to restrict habeas review in other contexts, notably
defaulted claims,'10 Fourth Amendment claims,' 0' and abuses of the writ.'0 2
However, as Justice O'Connor observed, "such costs are inevitable
whenever relief is awarded."' 0 Moreover, there is a significant difference
between computing social costs when the equities favor the state and when
the equities favor the petitioner. Plainly, if the prosecutor in Brecht had been
sensitive to the accused's rights and behaved ethically and professionally, the
prosecutor would not have violated a well-established constitutional rule.
Clearly, the prosecutor in Brecht knew exactly what he was doing. The
prosecutor measured his conduct not against a legal or ethical norm, but
against a prediction that the appellate court would view the extra mileage
gained from violating the defendant's due process rights as harmless. Of
course, if the prosecutor had not engaged in such calculated misconduct, no
court, federal or state, would have had occasion to invoke the rhetoric of
social costs. The state appellate court would have affirmed the conviction,
and federal review would have been unavailable and unnecessary.
By the same token, if the state appellate court had correctly evaluated
the prosecutor's constitutional violation in the first place and found under
the Chapman standard that the defendant deserved a new trial, the party
responsible for that burden properly would have borne the costs of litigation.
Indeed, these costs would have been viewed as the price the Constitution
imposes on the state for violating a defendant's constitutional rights. By
contrast, costs that the state originally avoided by defaulting in its duty to
provide prompt and effective relief should not later provide the so-called
"prudential" basis'0 4 for imposing on the other party whose rights were
violated a new and more stringent burden when that party seeks collaterally
to vindicate his constitutional rights.
Moreover, Brecht does not reduce the number of federal petitions or
relieve the federal courts of the burden of habeas litigation. Petitioners will
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2558-59 (1991).
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 478 n.11 (1976).
McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468-69 (1991).
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1758 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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raise the same constitutional challenges as before or seek to wedge their
arguments into the narrow exception for "deliberate and egregious" misconduct.105 The federal court must still review the entire record de novo, although
it now must evaluate the constitutional error under a more exacting standard.
Justice O'Connor noted that Kotteakos is a much more lenient, if not more
precise, standard than Chapman: "[I]t will permit more errors to pass
uncorrected ....

It does not decrease the burden of identifying those cases

that warrant relief."'10
A hypothetical closely resembling one that Justice White offered in Stone
v. Powell illustrates the illogic of the Court's double standard.? 7 Suppose
that two defendants, A and B, are jointly indicted for murder, are tried
separately, and are convicted on the same evidence. Each brings a state
appeal, arguing that the prosecutor made a constitutionally impermissible
reference to their failure to testify. The state appellate court agrees that
constitutional error was committed, but that under Chapman the error was
harmless. A seeks certiorari to the Supreme Court; B does not. The Supreme
Court grants A's petition and reverses A's conviction, concluding that the
error was not harmless under the Chapman standard. B then brings a habeas
petition in federal court. The court, consistent with the Supreme Court's
determination, concludes that constitutional error was committed and that
the error was not harmless under Chapman. However, the writ is denied
because under the new Brecht standard, the error is found harmless because
B did not prove that the error caused actual and substantial prejudice.
Although A and B were convicted on the same evidence and assert the same
constitutional error, A obtains relief because the error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, while B does not because B could not demonstrate
that the self-same error caused actual prejudice. As Justice White observed:
"I cannot believe that Congress intended this result." 108
III.

TBE EXPANSION OF HARMLESS ERROR

The scope and the standards governing appellate review of trial errors
have undergone a revolution under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The
harmless error rule authorizes appellate courts to sustain convictions when
the defendant's guilt is sufficiently clear, even though errors may have
produced an unfair trial.109 The rule originally developed as an appellate

105. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1731 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536-37 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). I thank my
colleague, Don Doernberg, for suggesting this variation.
108. Id. at 537.

109. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588-89 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("An automatic
application of harmless-error review in case after case, and for error after error, can only
encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting the Constitution to the ever-present
and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a particular case.").
Essentially, three different standards exist for appellate review of trial errors: the standard
for constitutional error formulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the standard
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mechanism to prevent "the mere etiquette of trials" or the "minutiae of
procedure" from upsetting a verdict." 0 The rule has evolved into the most
powerful judicial weapon to preserve convictions whenever an appellate
tribunal, sitting as a "super-jury," concludes that the defendant is clearly
guilty or that the error has not resulted in substantial prejudice. The most
perverse byproduct of the new harmless error jurisprudence is its corrosive
impact on the administration of criminal justice. The awareness that sufficient
proof of guilt will insulate a conviction from appellate reversal encourages
prosecutors and trial judges to overlook or deliberately violate constitutional
rights or engage in other evidentiary and procedural violations because
reviewing courts will find such errors to be harmless."' As Judge Jerome
Frank observed, to the extent that appellate courts routinely affirm convictions
despite serious violations, they can be viewed as condoning lawlessness, and
themselves promoting disrespect for the law." 2 By further insulating state
convictions from habeas review through the creation of a more relaxed
harmless error test, Brecht encourages state officials-prosecutors, trial judges,
and appellate judges-to overlook constitutional norms, or take them less
seriously.
Viewed historically, harmless error review was never intended to override
unfair process. In Bollenbach v. United States,"3 the Court stated that "the
question is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt
has been found by a jury according to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal trials in the federal courts."" 4 The Court's more recent
approach appears to equate a determination of guilt with a determination of
fairness. In Rose v. Clark,"5 the Court wrote: "Where a reviewing court can
find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be
affirmed."" 6 The intensity with which courts throughout the country have
invoked harmless error to preserve convictions despite serious constitutional,
evidentiary, and procedural violations inevitably invites the cynical response

for nonconstitutional error formulated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), and
the outcome-determinative standard for constitutional error formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See generally Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error,Prosecutorial
Misconduct, and Due Process: There's More to Due Process Than the Bottom Line, 88 CoLurm.
L. REa. 1298 (1988) (arguing that prosecutorial misconduct should not be examined using

outcome-derivative test).
110. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
111. See Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CIMA. L.
& CRiMINoLocY 421, 440 (1980) (arguing that harmless error tempts prosecutors to use evidence
or techniques they would otherwise avoid because of potential appellate reversal).
112. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks, Co., 155 F.2d 631, 662 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946).
113. 326 U.S. 607 (1946).
114. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946).
115. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
116. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:115

that "if [a defendant] is obviously guilty as charged, he has no fundamental
' 7
right to be tried fairly."
9
' 8
The harmless error rule has been described as "chaotic,"" "wayward,""
2
and "insidious"'1 due to its standardless and ad hoc application by appellate
judges who purport to be making precise quantitative and qualitative calculations of the impact of errors based on the "cold black and white of a
printed record."''2 Under the new harmless error jurisprudence, the trial's
outcome transcends the process. The reviewing court's apparent unwillingness
to appreciate that many errors cannot be quantified, and its inability to
measure accurately the distorting impact that such errors can have on the
truth-finding process, is increasingly evident, but increasingly deemed irrelevant.'2

Brecht offers a striking example of the essential absurdity of harmless
error review. Prior to the Supreme Court's review, three state appellate judges
and a federal district court concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct was
sufficiently harmful to require a new trial. Another state appellate court,
consisting of six judges, found the prosecutor's misconduct insufficiently
harmful. Another panel of three federal judges found the misconduct harmless
under the much more relaxed standard for nonconstitutional errors.
However, the most pernicious effect of Brecht is not that it will inevitably
prevent many constitutional violations from being corrected, although that
effect is an inevitable byproduct. Rather, Brecht provides an attractive inducement to state officials either to disregard constitutional rights entirely,
or to view the violation of the right less seriously than would be the case if
effective federal oversight were available. Under the Brecht standard, a federal
court on habeas review could conclude that a constitutional error was committed and that the error was harmful under the Chapman standard, but
nevertheless deny the writ because the petitioner failed to prove that the
violation caused actual and substantial prejudice to his case. Furthermore,
even though Arizona v. Fuiminante'm subjects virtually every type of constitutional violation to harmless error review, Brecht effectively locks 24the door
to meaningful habeas review of most constitutional trial violations.'

117. Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of Political Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 486

(1959).
118. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error,59 VA. L. REv. 988, 998 (1973).

119.

TRAYNOR,

supra note 86, at 13.

120. Goldberg, supra note 111, at 421.
121. United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1970) (quoting United States
v. Ah Kee Eng, 241 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1957)).
122. For several examples of the courts' refusal to recognize harmful conduct, see Bennett
L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. Pnrr. L. REv. 393, 428 n.226 (1992).
123. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).

124. Some federal courts have adopted Justice Stevens' cautionary approach in reviewing
constitutional violations under the new Brecht standard, suggesting that the new standard may
not have locked the courthouse doors entirely. For cases upholding the grant of the writ under
the new standard, see Shaw v. Collins, 5 F.3d 128 (5th Cir. 1993) (Sixth Amendment confrontation
violation for prosecutor to refuse to call complaining witness); Duest v. Singletary, 997 F.2d
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CONCLUSION

Brecht v. Abrahamson strikes a heavy blow to effective federal oversight

of state constitutional violations. Brecht does not prevent a petitioner from
entering the federal courthouse gate to have his petition considered on the

merits, but it locks the courtroom doors to meaningful review of those merits.
The Court reached a confusing and illogical result in an unprincipled manner.
Having granted certiorari to examine whether a discrete constitutional rulea Doyle violation-should be analyzed on collateral review under a more
relaxed harmless error standard, the Court concluded that every constitutional
claim involving trial error should be similarly evaluated. The Court justified
this ruling by invoking the rhetoric of finality, federalism, and judicial

economy that traditionally has been associated with institutional concerns
over protecting judgments that were fairly obtained or when the complaining
party engaged in procedural default or abuse of the writ. Brecht is the first
case to insulate from effective federal habeas review state judgments that are
unconstitutionally
potentially flawed
valid institutional
perverse extension

obtained, but nevertheless have been upheld following
state appellate review. Although purporting to be based on
considerations, Brecht v. Abrahamson is an illogical and
of the Rehnquist Court's campaign to rid the federal courts

of habeas corpus.

1336 (1lth Cir. 1993) (Eighth Amendment violation to allow jury to consider vacated conviction
when deciding whether to impose death sentence), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1126 (1994); Stoner
v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1993) (Sixth Amendment confrontation violation to use
videotape deposition testimony instead of live witness testimony); Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d
770 (5th Cir. 1993) (Sixth Amendment confrontation violation to use videotaped interview of
complaining witness); Standen v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir.) (due process violation to
allow withdrawn guilty plea to be used as substantive evidence against defendant), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 579 (1993); Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1993) (due process violation to
admit evidence of uncharged crime); McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993) (due
process violation to use character evidence to show propensity), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622
(1993); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715 (11th Cir. 1993) (Sixth Amendment confrontation
violation to allow complaining witness to testify outside courtroom and outside defendant's
presence), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993).

